The Law of Passing Off – Goodwill Beyond Goods by Ng, Catherine W.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Law of Passing Off – goodwill beyond goods 
Author:  Catherine W. Ng  
c.w.ng@abdn.ac.uk 
+44 (0)1224273897 
University of Aberdeen  
School of Law 
Taylor Building 
Old Aberdeen  AB24 3UB 
United Kingdom 
 
2 
 
The Law of Passing Off – goodwill beyond goods 
Abstract:  Claimants in England have no specific right to object to third party use of their personal identities.  
Where the fact scenarios appear to fit, claimants have brought actions under the law of passing off.  The House 
of Lords once declared the English law of passing off as the ‘most protean’ among unfair trading wrongs for 
traders who suffer a resulting loss of business or goodwill.  Until the recent cases of Irvine v. Talksport and 
Fenty v. Arcadia Group Brands Limited, claimants have not been successful.  Has the law been rendered more 
protean with the recent extensions to cover, in these two cases respectively, false endorsement claims and false 
merchandising claims?   This work takes a bifurcated view of the concept of goodwill to show that throughout 
the development of the English law of passing off, claimants are concerned with the protection not only of their 
trade at hand, and with distinguishing it from that of rival traders.  Above all, claimants are concerned with the 
protection of their control over the aspect of their goodwill which garners their trade going forward.  By 
increasingly taking a contextual approach in appreciating the public understanding of branding practices and 
applying it within the doctrinal framework of the law to address the claimants’ fundamental concerns, the courts 
are treating the law of passing off with coherence and yet with relevance to contemporary commercial and social 
practices.   
Keywords:  passing off, goodwill, personality right, branding, instrumental value, intrinsic value 
The House of Lords once declared the English law of passing off as the ‘most protean’1 among unfair 
trading wrongs for traders who suffer a resulting loss of business or goodwill.  While the law of passing off 
states that no trader is to pass off his or her goods as those of another,
2
 the current law in England does not 
protect traders only against counterfeiters.
3
  It is said to protect the claimant’s trade goodwill from harm.4  The 
parameters of such goodwill have extended over time.  Recent cases dealing with well-known personalities 
appear to have extended them further.  This work aims to show that throughout the development of the English 
law of passing off, claimants are concerned not only with the protection of their trade at hand, but above all, 
with the protection of their control over the aspect of goodwill which garners their trade going forward.  Brands 
                                                          
1
 Diplock LJ, Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap v. J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd, [1979] AC 731 (HL), p. 
740.  
2
Perry v. Truefitt, (1842) 5 Beav 66, 49 ER 749 (Ch); Oliver LJ, Reckitt and Colman Products Limited v. 
Borden Inc, [1990] 1 WLR 491 (HL), p. 499.  For simplicity, ‘goods’ hereafter includes services, unless the 
context indicates or implies otherwise.   
3
 Irvine v. Talksport, [2002] 1 WLR 2355 (Ch), pp. 2361 – 2363, paras. 18 – 21.  
4
 Ibid, p. 2366, para 34; Fenty v. Arcadia Group Brands Limited, [2015] 1 WLR 3291 (CA), p. 3300, para. 33; 
Starbucks (HK) Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting Group Pls, [2015] 1 WLR 2628 (SC), p. 2635, para. 21.  
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seek not only to distinguish their goods from those of others’ instrumentally in the market place.  They seek to 
retain and expand their ongoing influence on their clientele and prospective clientele through a more holistic 
intrinsic appeal in their goodwill.  The contention here is that by increasingly taking a contextual approach 
within a doctrinal framework to address the claimants’ fundamental concerns, the courts are treating the law of 
passing off with coherence and relevance.  They are accounting for both the instrumental and intrinsic value in 
the goodwill of brands.  This work takes this bifurcated view to analyse the claimant’s goodwill under the law of 
passing off.  
The analysis here will focus on the law of passing off where the disputed representation evokes the 
claimant’s personal identity.  As will be discussed later,5 the considerations here have broader application in the 
law.  In the cases which evoke the claimants’ personal identities, the claimants’ concern over the control of the 
goodwill attached to their identity is most acute because personal identities are least alienable.  Furthermore, 
these claimants’ personal identities are inextricably bound up with their trade identities.  These claimants are 
often known beyond a defined trade sector; they challenge the traditional confines of ‘trade goodwill’ in the law.  
In resolving disputes dealing with personal identities, recent courts have taken into consideration the social 
dynamics between consumers and the claimants’ brands in the creation of goodwill in the marketplace.     
In contrast to their counterparts in jurisdictions such as in the US, claimants in England have no 
specific right to object to third party use of their personalities.
6
  Where the fact scenarios appear to fit, claimants 
have brought actions under the law of passing off.  After a series of failures, claimants have recently succeeded 
in Irvine v. Talksport
7
 and Fenty v. Arcadia Group Brands Limited.
8
    Fenty concerns a well-known fashion 
retailer defendant selling T-shirts which bore the image of the pop star claimant Robyn Rihanna Fenty 
(professionally known as ‘Rihanna’).  With no other legal recourse, Fenty’s passing off claim developed from 
the false endorsement claim in Irvine.  Irvine involves the use of an altered photograph of well-known Formula 
One racer Eddie Irvine to advertise the defendant’s sports radio station.  Moreover, in Irvine the High Court 
noted: 
                                                          
5
 See text to infra notes 156 - 157. 
6
 See for example Walsh 2013; de Landa Barajas 2009; Vaver 2006; Klink 2003. 
7
 Supra note 3; affirmed on merit [2003] 2 All ER 881 (CA).  See also text to infra notes 108 - 117.  
8
 [2014] IP & T 827 (Ch); affirmed [2015] 1 WLR 3291 (CA).  See also text to infra notes 140 -152.  
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no matter how irrational it may seem to a lawyer, those in business have reason to believe that the 
lustre of a famous personality, if attached to their goods or services, will enhance the attractiveness of 
those goods or services to their target market.
9
   
 
As commonly accepted,
10
 the three basic elements of the English law of passing off which a claimant 
must establish are often abstracted to:  first, a goodwill which arises from an association of the claimant’s goods 
with the claimant’s distinctive identifier (such as a brand name or logo) in the public’s mind such that the public 
would recognise the claimant’s goods by the identifier; second, a misrepresentation (whether or not intentional) 
by the defendant to the public which would lead or likely lead the public to believe that the defendant’s goods 
are those of the claimant’s; and finally, the damage or likelihood of damage to the claimant’s goodwill from the 
erroneous belief would or likely result from the defendant’s misrepresentation.11  This goodwill is commonly 
defined in the law of passing off as ‘the attractive force which brings in custom’.12   
This work argues that as recent courts are increasingly taking a contextual approach to the law, they are 
increasingly addressing goodwill in terms of what legal theorist Joseph Raz called the instrumental and intrinsic 
value in respect of the law he analysed.  This work will start with a brief discussion of these terms with a brief 
reference to branding.  It will then note the gradual movement in passing off decisions from a doctrinal approach 
towards a pragmatic approach guided by legal doctrines.   
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that both the judge-made law of passing off and the UK 
trade marks legislation regulate branding.  They are often applied within the same fact scenarios.
13
  Trade Marks 
Act 1994 (‘TMA’) is intended, inter alia, to implement the relevant EU Directive14 to approximate the laws of 
the Member States relating to trade marks.  The protection it offers differs from that under the law of passing 
off.  Passing off is not confined to that resulting from the use of registered trade marks.  While the TMA protects 
                                                          
9
 Laddie J, Irvine (Ch), supra note 3, p. 2368, para 39; see also Fenty (CA), ibid, p. 3303, para 38. 
10
 See for example Starbucks (HK) Ltd (SC), supra note 4, p. 2633, para 15. 
11
 Reckitt and Colman Products Limited, supra note 2, p. 406.  
12
 Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Muller & Co’s Margarine Ltd, [1901] AC 217, p. 224, also cited in Breyer 
Group Plc v. Department of Energy and Climate Change, [2015] 1 WLR 4559 (CA), pp. 4576 – 4577, para. 44.  
See also text at infra notes 66 - 75. 
13
 Trade Marks Act 1994, Sec. 2(2).  See for example Arsenal v. Reed, [2001] RPC 46 (Ch) where claims were 
filed under both the law of passing off and Trade Marks Act 1994; the claim for passing off failed, while the 
claim for trade mark infringement was referred to the ECJ.  On the passing off claim, see text at infra notes 132 
- 138.  See also Ni Shuilleabhain 2003.  
14
 Trade Marks Act 1994, preamble; Council Directive No 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988; now Directive 
2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 (‘TMD’).  See also infra note 
22.    
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trade marks as property immediately upon registration,
15
 the law of passing off is said to protect as property the 
trade goodwill that develops in the marketplace.
16
  To constitute the tort, passing off further requires 
misrepresentation leading to confusion among a relevant public and potential resulting harm to the claimant’s 
goodwill.  Trade mark infringement, under the TMA and the corresponding EU Directive, requires no public 
confusion in cases where the disputed marks are identical and used for identical goods (double identity),
17
 and in 
cases where the claimant’s mark has a reputation and the disputed use of the mark or a similar mark without due 
cause would take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the mark 
(dilution).
18
  Trade mark infringement requires public confusion or its likelihood where identical marks are used 
for similar goods or where similar marks are used for identical goods between the parties.
19
  Conceptual issues 
ensue in view of the overlaps among these categories of statutory protection.
20
  The set of trade mark functions 
(including the origin function, the advertising function, investment function, communication function)
21
 that the 
Court of Justice of the European Union has derived, and that these provisions are said to protect, has created 
uncertainties as to how these functions ought to be applied, the vagueness in the meaning of the functions, and 
the open-ended nature of this list of functions.
22
  This work is however focussed on the protection of goodwill 
from a particular type of misrepresentation in passing off, rather than the protection of a defined mark.     
1. Legal theory - as applied to branding: 
What underpins the law of passing off may be seen through Raz’s conception of the instrumental and 
intrinsic value in the law that he analyses, but applied in this work to branding.  Raz’s analysis concerning 
personal and collective identities, as set out in his essays in Between Authority and Interpretation,
23
 is 
                                                          
15
 Trade Marks Act 1994, Sec. 2. 
16
 Starbucks (HK) Ltd (SC), supra note 4, p. 2635 para. 21; Irvine (Ch), supra note 3, p. 2366, paras. 32 – 34.  
See also infra note 41.  
17
 Trade Marks Act 1994, Sec. 10(1) in relation to TMD, Art. 5(1)(a). 
18
 Trade Marks Act 1994, Sec. 10(3) in relation to TMD, Art. 5(2).   
19
 Trade Marks Act 1994, Sec. 10(2) in relation to TMD, Art. 5(1)(b). 
20
 See for example regarding double identity:  C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed, [2003] Ch 454 
(CJEU), p. 460, para. 27; C-323/09 Interflora Inc v. Marks & Spencer Plc, [2012] Bus LR 1440 (CJEU), pp. 
1146-1147, para. 20, p. 1148, paras. 27, 28; Senftleben 2014; regarding dilution C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure 
[2010] Bus LR 303 (CJEU), p. 314, para. 30; C-408/01 Adidas Salomon AG v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd, [2004] 
Ch 120 (CJEU), p. 123, para. 12; see also Kur 2014; Dinwoodie 2013.  
21
 See for example Arsenal Football Club Plc (CJEU), ibid, pp. 466 – 468, paras. 48 – 51; C-323/09 Interflora 
Inc v. Marks & Spencer Plc, supra, note 20, pp. 1449-1454, paras. 34 - 66, C-487/07 L’Oréal (CJEU), ibid, p. 
322, paras. 58, 60. 
22
 Blythe 2015; Kur 2014; Senftleben 2014; Dupont 2013; Cornthwaite 2012; Chronopoulos 2011; Yap 2009.  
See also Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (Recast), p. L336/3, preamble paras. 16, 18 – 
20; Senftleben et al 2015. 
23
 Raz 2009.  He is not the only author to have advanced some of the ideas here; see most notably Hart 2012, 
Dworkin 1998.  Earlier edition or printing of these works (among others) is referred to in Raz 2009, for example 
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particularly pertinent because modern branding similarly draws on such identities.
24
  Both law and brands seek 
to influence their constituents.  Brands do so through the utility of their underlying goods, and the personal and 
collective interpretations of the social meanings and values imbued in the brands and their goods.  The law may 
do so by the authority of its institutions and by the rights and duties enforced by way of regulatory, civil, and 
criminal sanctions that these institutions may impose.  Nevertheless, both seek to exert influence, and may do so 
by gaining acceptance among their constituents 
Raz responds to the question of why an individual would be subject to the will of another under the law, 
with the service conception,
25
 that is, a subject may have other reasons than the law to behave in a way required 
by the law.  A subject may also judge that conformance with the law would remove the need for individual 
experimentation, reasoning, and decision making,
26
 and ultimately avoid social conflicts otherwise caused by 
the subject’s own assertions.  The law is all the more compelling where constituents identify with it and where it 
is consonant with their broader political and social reality.
27
  That reality includes the social values which 
inform the substantive contents of the law and the social values upon which institutions are founded to 
formulate, recognise, implement, and enforce the law.   
On the one hand the role of authority is to enable people better to conform to reason, that is to make it 
more likely that they will, given good will, conduct themselves as reason requires.  To that extent the 
law is to be treated essentially instrumentally.  On the other hand, in being partly constitutive of a 
community which is normally a focus of identification, the law can be intrinsically valuable.
28
   
Instrumentally, the law seeks to mould the conduct of and the social relations among its constituents.  As 
individuals, these constituents seek a sense of self-respect, self-worth, and a sense of orientation in their 
environment by belonging to various communities which they respect and with which they identify.  Guided by 
emotions and judgement, they may accept as their own the standards that those communities endorse.  ‘Given 
the importance of political communities in the life of their members, an ability to identify with one’s political 
community is … intrinsically valuable.’29  Through its instrumental and intrinsic value, the law can mobilise its 
constituents to achieve social conditions which depend on the collective action of a critical mass; such action 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
respective note 5 at p. 19 and note 14 at p. 34 therein.  See also Balganesh and Parchomovsky 2015; Brudner 
2013; MacCormick 2005. 
24
 See for example Wolter et al 2016; Breazeale and Fournier 2012, p. 404; Edvardsson et al (2011). 
25
 Raz 2009, pp. 136 – 137 (footnote omitted). 
26
 Ibid, pp. 7, 110, 137 – 142. 
27
 Ibid, p. 152. 
28
 Ibid, p. 112. 
29
 Ibid, p. 106. 
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may in turn move others to conform.
30
  The law can then coordinate diverse social interests to address moral 
concerns and advance economic and social agendas.
31
  The law becomes an artefact of a collective identity; it in 
turn informs that collective identity by formalising part of its social norm to become social facts which are 
endorsed by the competent legal authority.
32
  Constituents may point to the law as a social fact which demands 
conformance to achieve certain social conditions, and position themselves in relation to that social fact.  Their 
positioning influences others who identify with them and who may adopt the standards they endorse.    
1.1 Branding 
Similarly, brands can have instrumental and intrinsic value which influences their target markets.  ‘A 
brand is much more than merely a “legally defensible proprietary name” and it serves more than as a 
differentiating device, indicating source:  brands are essentially identity systems, encompassing a personality, a 
relationship, and an image in consumers’ minds.’33  Purchase decisions are driven by both reason and emotion.  
‘[P]roducts are carriers of socially shared symbolic meanings that manifest themselves in cognitive and 
behavioural reactions that are guided by a multiplicity of motives, specifically including emotions and social 
aspirations, and not only by a “rational” cost-benefit assessment.’34  Brands use indicia to distinguish the goods 
of one trader from those of other traders.  Instrumentally, the indicia identify for consumers the goods which, ‘as 
reason requires’, may be functionally more fitting than others for the consumers’ use.  They help consumers 
avoid experimentation with purchase decisions – they help consumers identify repeat purchases or 
recommended purchases.  They also minimise social risks.   For example, McDonald’s reassuringly declares on 
the pylons at many of its fast food restaurants the ‘billions [of customers] served’.  Furthermore, as with law, 
brands are imbued with social meanings and values.  These social meanings and values form the basis for the 
intrinsic value in a brand.  In the case of McDonald’s, these social meanings and values derive from, inter alia, 
the goods offered, the promotional efforts, and the ambience of the service venue.
35
  They also derive from the 
clientele attracted to the brand.  McDonald’s customers are identifiable by the GOLDEN ARCHES36 on the 
                                                          
30
 Ibid, p. 342. 
31
 Ibid, pp. 178 – 181, 192 – 193, 342, 346 – 348. 
32
 Ibid, pp. 99 – 115. 
33
 Schwarzkopf 2010, pp. 165 – 166. 
34
 Ibid, pp. 173 – 176 (references omitted).  See also Davis and Maniatis 2010, p. 124.  
35
 Corporate Design Foundation 2006-2007. 
36
 See for example issued to McDonald’s International Property Company, Ltd Trade Mark UK00001285808 for 
Class 43 for restaurant services http://www.ipo.gov.uk/tmcase/Results/1/UK00001285808 accessed 28 March 
2016; Trade Mark UK00001115186 for Class 16 which includes printed matter; paper and cardboard products, 
and Class 28 for games (other than ordinary playing cards), toys, and playthings 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/tmcase/Results/1/UK00001115186 accessed 28 March 2016; Trade Mark 
UK00001044476 for Class 30 which includes coffee, tea, sandwiches, and seasonings 
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goods they carry out.  Brands and their consumers as a collective inform and nourish each other’s identities, in 
contradistinction against those who embrace different social values,
37
 and therefore select different goods or 
different brands.  Brands also select role models with whom their target markets would identify.  As part of its 
‘Forever Young’ rebranding campaign to reach health conscious young adults, McDonald’s clown mascot, 
Ronald McDonald, appeared in Olympics advertisements and also with sports stars such as Yao Ming, Serena 
Williams, and Venus Williams.
38
  Brands use their indicia-bearing mascot or spokespersons, role models and 
customers to cast themselves as ‘partly constitutive of a community which is normally a focus of 
identification.’39  Consumers too use brands to help negotiate their sense of identity, social belonging or 
aspirations. 
If we use ‘names’ as handles for grasping the more hidden cognitive processes synthesising consumption, 
and if we view goods and their names as the accessible parts of an information system, the consumer’s 
problem in achieving his life-project becomes clearer.  He needs goods to give marking services and to 
get marking services; that is, he has to be present at other people’s rituals of consumption to be able to 
circulate his own judgements of the fitness of the things used to celebrate the diverse occasions.
40
     
He would also be able there to formulate his own judgement of the fitness of that consumer as representative of 
a community with which he would identify and whose endorsed goods he would adopt for himself.  Brands may 
thereby further exert their appeal.  
2. Passing Off 
While the law of passing off has long recognised the instrumental value in brands, it has only recently 
come to recognise their intrinsic value explicitly where the brand appeal reaches across diverse trade sectors.  
The founding principle of the law that no trader may pass off his or her goods as those of another enforces the 
brands’ instrumental value in distinguishing the goods which may serve the consumers’ utilitarian needs.  The 
goodwill element requires that the relevant public has prior familiarity with the claimant’s brand.41  While the 
law may instrumentally protect repeat and recommended purchases, it may also protect an intrinsic value 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/tmcase/Results/1/UK00001044476 accessed 28 March 2016; Trade Mark 
UK00001026605 for Class 29 for hamburgers, cheeseburgers, French fried potatoes, milk, milkshakes, and 
cooked chicken http://www.ipo.gov.uk/tmcase/Results/1/UK00001026605 accessed 28 March 2016. 
37
 Schmitt 2012. 
38
 Light and Kiddon 2009, p. 137. 
39
 Supra note 28.  
40
 Douglas and Isherwood 1979, p. 81.  See also Bourdieu 1991, pp. 220, 223-224. 
41
 Inland Revenue Commissioners, supra note 12, p. 224 ‘[goodwill] is the one thing which distinguishes an old-
established business from a new business at its first start.  … goodwill is worth nothing unless it has power of 
attraction sufficient to bring customers home to the source from which it emanates.’  See also, for example 
Irvine (Ch), supra note 3, pp. 2369 – 2370, para. 46.    
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cultivated through the social dynamics in the marketplace between consumers and brands along with the 
individuals who are perceived to be associated with these brands.  In this light, the intrinsic value in brands 
involves more than a reputation that is received and assessed by the relevant public in a defamation sense.  It 
engages with the sense of identity and social belonging or aspiration of the relevant public in a way that would 
influence business decisions.  The decision maker’s own identity is at stake.  However, until recently, the law of 
passing off has not fully acknowledged the claimants’ desire to regain this intrinsic value brands enjoy to 
influence business decision.  Much of this gap arose from the doctrinal limitations in conceptualising the 
goodwill protected under the law.  Much of the current closing of this gap is attributable to the increasing 
judicial attention paid to the public interactions with branding practices in the marketplace.  This development 
recently coincides with an emerging human rights discourse involving privacy rights, rights to freedom of 
expression, and property rights.  This discourse may be viewed as what Raz might identify as a part of the 
broader political and social reality within which the law operates.  It forms a backdrop that appears consonant 
with the recent more holistic approach to the law of passing off.  The UK Human Rights Act 1998 was 
introduced in October 2000
42
 to provide further domestic consideration
43
 of the rights addressed in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
44
 (ECHR) and buttressed in the 
Charter of the Fundamental Right of the European Union.
45
  The Charter came into force under the Lisbon 
Treaty in December 2009.  In this light, the emerging human rights jurisprudence may also shed light on certain 
recent developments in the law of passing off.      
2.1 Early conceptualisation of goodwill 
The passing off claimants’ concerns extend beyond economic loss; they generally prefer injunctive relief 
over monetary relief.  While an award of damages would address the loss of revenue from the passing off, 
injunctive relief allows claimants to regain their intrinsic value in the brand to influence their clientele and 
prospective clientele.  It is arguably at least in part the early claimants’ desire for injunctive relief which gave 
the tort its proprietary character.  That characterisation remains with the goodwill element in the law to-day.
46
    
This characterisation and its boundaries however also limited claimants from gaining a fuller protection of the 
intrinsic value in their brands under the law.   
                                                          
42
 See also Vaver 2006. 
43
 Hale 2013. 
44
 Rome, 4 XI 1950. 
45
Arts. 7, 17, and 11 respectively.  See also Griffiths 2015; Geiger 2009. 
46
 Starbucks (HK) Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc, [2014] IP & T 128 (CA), p. 147, para. 103, 
affirmed (SC) supra note 4.  
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At the time that the term ‘pass off’ first appeared in the headnote of the 1842 case of Perry v. Truefitt,47 
the Courts of Chancery alone had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief.  They also had clear jurisdiction to 
uphold proprietary interest,
48
 as they did in aid of evident legal rights.  Perry was a classic goods-for-goods 
substitution case.  The plaintiff there claimed the defendant’s use of TRUEFITT’S MEDICATED MEXICAN 
BALM would be injurious to PERRY’S MEDICATED MEXICAN BALM which enjoyed extensive sales and 
repute, and asserted that the public would be deceived by the similarity in the names.  Lord Langdale as Master 
of the Roll stated: 
whether he has or not a property in the name or the mark, I have no doubt that another person has not a 
right to use that name or mark for the purposes of deception, and in order to attract to himself that 
course of trade, or that custom, which, without that improper act, would have flowed to the person who 
first used, or was alone in the habit of using the particular name or mark.
49
 
However later in Clark v. Freeman
50
 brought by an apparent endorser who was not in trade, Lord Langdale 
declined jurisdiction.  Sir James Clark, who was Physician in Ordinary to Her Majesty and specialised in 
consumption, sued the defendant for selling pills called SIR JAMES CLARKE’S CONSUMPTION PILLS and 
for publishing advertisements commencing with ‘By Her Majesty the Queen’s permission, Sir James Clarke’s 
Consumption Pills’.  There was no other Sir J Clark in the practice of medicine in England at the time.  Clark 
pleaded fraud and claimed injury to his professional character with loss to his income.  While disapproving of 
the defendant’s act as potentially libellous, Lord Langdale found no interest for his court to protect because 
Clark neither manufactured nor sold pills.
51
  In Perry even though proprietary interest was not established there, 
the law of passing off was called upon to protect the instrumental value in the plaintiff’s name and to distinguish 
its goods from the defendant’s, and thereby to protect the plaintiff’s extensive intrinsic value from exploitation.  
In Clark, the plaintiff had no instrumental value at stake because he was not in trade; he was implicated in the 
defendant’s trade arguably only for the intrinsic value in his professional status – the defendant used Clark’s 
status as Physician in Ordinary to the Queen and a specialist in consumption to attract the public to the 
                                                          
47
 Perry, supra note 2, pp. 73, 752. 
48
 Hall v. Barrows, (1863) 4 De Gex, Jones & Smith 150, 46 ER 873 (Ch); Edelsten v. Edelsten, (1863) 1 De 
Gex Jones & Smith 185, 46 ER 72 (QB).  
49
 Perry, supra note 2, pp. 73, 752. 
50
 (1848) 11 Beav 112, 50 ER 759 (Ch). 
51
 Ibid, pp. 119, 762. 
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defendant’s consumption pills.  Lord Langdale’s decision in Clark was later largely discredited:52  ‘Could not a 
professional man be injured in his profession by having his name associated with a quack medicine?’53   
It proved conceptually difficult to capture in law this intrinsic value in brands.  Mindful of proprietary 
models in pre-existing copyright
54
 and emerging registered trade marks,
55
 early courts were circumspect in 
determining where the proprietary interest for passing off should lie.  Lord Westbury who was Lord Chancellor 
from 1861 to 1865 found that fraud in the defendant was not necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction at 
Chancery.
56
  However:  
Imposition on the public is indeed necessary for the Plaintiff's title, but in this way only, that it is the 
test of the invasion by the Defendant of the Plaintiff's right of property; for there is no injury if the 
mark used by the Defendant is not such as is mistaken, or is likely to be mistaken, by the public for the 
mark of the Plaintiff; but the true ground of this Court's jurisdiction is property, and the necessity of 
interfering to protect it by reason of the inadequacy of the legal remedy.
57
 
The likelihood of consumer confusion of the defendant’s mark for the plaintiff’s was a proxy for the potential 
proprietary harm to the plaintiff and possibly gain for the defendant.
58
  Consumers had
59
 and still have no right 
of action under the tort.  Lord Westbury’s notion of property meant an exclusive right to use one’s name or mark 
on a particular manufacture or vendible commodity.
60
  It did not lie in the mark on its own but in the acceptance 
and currency gained by that mark as applied to an article in the marketplace.
61
  Lord Cranworth later stated the 
proprietary interest would lie in an exclusive right to use a mark for the purpose of indicating where, by whom, 
or at what manufactory the underlying goods were manufactured.
62
  While value was attached to ‘goodwill’, the 
                                                          
52
 For example Hogg v. Maxwell, (1866-67) LR 2 Ch App 307, p. 310; Springhead Spinning Company v. Riley, 
(1868) LR 6 Eq 551; Dixon v. Holden, (1868-69) LR 7 Eq 488; Walter v. Ashton, [1902] 2 Ch 282.  
53
 Seldon LJ in obiter, Re Rivière’s Trade-mark (1884) 26 ChD 48 (CA), p. 53. 
54
 See Sherman and Bently 1999, pp. 166-172. 
55
 Bently 2008, pp. 16-27.  See also Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, Sec. 3.  
56
 Hall, supra note 48, pp. 156, 876.  
57
 Ibid, 159, 877; see also The Leather Cloth Company v. The American Leather Cloth Company, Limited, 
(1863) 4 De Gex, Jones & Smith 137, 46 ER 868 (Ch). 
58
 Hall, supra note 48, pp. 159, 877; later Singer v. Loog, (1882) LR 8 (HL), pp. 13, 39.  See also Irvine (Ch), 
supra note 3, p. 2361, para. 18.  
59
 Webster v. Webster, (1791) 2 Swans 492, 36 ER 949 (Ch).  
60
 Hall, supra note 48, pp. 158-159, 877; The Leather Cloth Company (Ch), supra note 57, pp. 142, 144, 870-
871. 
61
 Edelsten, supra note 48, p. 201; Hall, supra note 48, pp. 876-877, 157-159; The Leather Cloth Company (Ch), 
supra note 57, affirmed (1865) XI HL 523, 11 ER 1435 (Lord Westbury); M’Andrew v. Bassett, (1864) 4 De 
Gex, Jones & Smith 380, 46 ER 965 (Ch); Wotherspoon v. Currie, (1871-72) LR 5 (HL) 508, p. 522. 
62
 The Leather Cloth Company (HL), ibid, pp. 533-534, 1440. 
12 
 
meaning of that term within a passing off context remained conceptually difficult.
63
  The 1875 trade mark 
legislation which introduced trade mark registration in the United Kingdom recognised proprietorship in trade 
marks.
64
  However it was not until 1915 that the House of Lords in Spalding v. Gamage finally settled that the 
proprietary interest to be protected under passing off lied with the goodwill engendered by the goods or the 
business as conveyed by the associated mark.
65
  Such goodwill, then defined as ‘the attractive force which 
brings in custom’,66 had already gained acceptance as ‘property’ within other legal contexts, for example in tax 
and in the sale or valuation of businesses.
67
   
However, this goodwill captures a snapshot of the commercial value of the property, the instrumental 
value in a brand.  It does not address the intrinsic value that claimants also seek to protect in their brands under 
the law of passing off.  The same definition is used today within a human rights context with respect to the 
property right in goodwill.
68
  Art. 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR states:  ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled 
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possession’.  While goodwill and other property rights are recognised as 
‘possessions’,69 goodwill here is limited to accrued income or that within a ‘legitimate expectation’ at a relevant 
date.  It excludes market share
70
 and other future income and control over such income.
71
  The article protects 
‘”goodwill”, as a form of asset with a snapshot monetary value, and does not protect an expected stream of 
future income which, for mainly organisational reasons, cannot be or is not capitalised.’72  The precise division 
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 See for example Wedderburn v. Wedderburn (No. 4), (1856) 22 Beav 84, 52 ER 1039 (Ch); Churton v. 
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533, 1440; Wadlow 2011, pp. 23 – 24, paras. 1-037, pp. 32 – 33, 1-048; Bone 2006,  pp. 569-570; McKenna 
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line remains unclear.
73
  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal has concluded in obiter that ‘the attractive force 
which brings in custom’74 where it pertains to the trader’s reputation or past clients’ loyalty would not be a 
‘possession’ under Art. 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR.75  This definition of ‘goodwill’ does not fully capture the 
forward looking intrinsic value in brands – what the claimants in Clark and more recently in Irvine and Fenty 
sought to protect.  
2.2 Goodwill in quality or class  
As brands seek to engage their clientele and prospective clientele with a sense of identity and social 
belonging or aspiration, they look to expand their points of engagement to more comprehensively embrace the 
lifestyles and social values of their target markets.  They diversify and tailor their offerings to their target 
markets.  While Spalding settled that property rights lied with trade goodwill in passing off, it also recognised 
that goodwill attracted customers in a way beyond Lord Cranworth’s conception of indicating the trade origin of 
the underlying goods.
76
  The defendant in Spalding sold goods manufactured by the plaintiff and bore the 
plaintiff’s trade marks.  Those goods, having been found substandard by the plaintiff, had been withdrawn and 
sold to waste rubber merchants.  The defendant purchased the goods from the waste rubber merchants and 
resold the goods at retail for their initial intended use under the plaintiff’s original mark.  There was no 
misrepresentation as to trade origin.  Nevertheless, the court found the proposition that no one had a right to 
represent his goods as the goods of another must implicate the corollary that no one had a right to represent the 
goods of one quality or class to be the goods of a different quality or of a different class.
77
  The claimant’s 
goodwill protected under passing off signalled to the relevant public not only the source of the goods, but also 
the quality or class of the goods.  ‘Extended passing off’ eventually acknowledges that goodwill may be shared 
among different enterprises which offer goods of a particular quality or class.
78
  Permitting trade marks to be 
used by diverse sources of goods has become conceivable where these goods are of a particular quality or class.   
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Baretto JJ dissent – p. 331, para. 3:  that clientele and reputation are rights and interests protected by law in 
respect of the legitimate expectation created by the filing of a trade mark application.  See also Breyer Group 
Plc, supra note 12, p. 4576, para. 43. 
76
 The Leather Cloth Company (HL), supra note 61, pp. 533-534, 1440; see also text to supra note 62.   
77
 AG Spalding, supra note 65.  
78
 Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap, supra note 1; Dawnay Day & Co Ltd v. Cantor Fitzgerald 
International, [2000] RPC 669 (CA): Fage UK Limited v. Chobani UK Limited, [2014] FSR 29 (CA). 
14 
 
This conceptual shift opened the way for traders to extend their brand protection beyond product 
segments to market segments.
79
  ‘Social lives have things’; ‘things have social lives’.80   The more the 
claimants’ and the consumers’ social identities are intertwined through the claimants’ branded goods, the higher 
the claimants’ intrinsic value in their brands, the less fungible its goodwill.81  This occurs particularly where the 
consumers’ sense of personal identity, social belonging or aspiration is closely tied with the consumption of 
particular brands of goods.  This tie is fostered through branded goods which embrace the lifestyle and social 
values of the target market.  For example, McDonald’s restaurants offer co-branded games for children as 
promotional items,
82
 and support Ronald McDonald House Charities which promotes children welfare.
83
  These 
diverse ventures unrelated to the food industry imbue the brand with a coherent set of social meaning and values 
for a target market (in the case of McDonald’s, its traditional toddlers-and-parents market) to identify with the 
brand, and for the brand to garner intrinsic value thereby.  Crucially, the conceptual shift allows traders to 
extend their goodwill beyond their specialised trade, to leverage their goodwill from one trade to another so long 
as they appear to their relevant public to be retaining control over the quality and their classes of goods.   
2.3  Goodwill across trade sectors  
However, third party exploitation of this goodwill across trade sectors, by non-rival traders, was not 
recognised by the law of passing off because it was seen to lie beyond the conceptual bounds of the claimant’s 
proprietary interest.  In the 1947 case of McCulloch v. Lewis A May (Produce Distributors) Ltd,
84
  a children’s 
radio programme personality was denied relief when his public persona ‘Uncle Mac’ was arguably evoked for 
UNCLE MAC breakfast cereal.  Under the initial goods-for-goods substitution model of passing off where the 
claimants’ customers would be lost to the defendants’ rival trade, the parties shared a common field of trade.  
Given the diversity of trade between a radio personality and a breakfast cereal in this case, the court commented 
‘If it were anything, it were libel’.85  A common field of trade between the parties appeared to be a requirement 
to constitute the tort. 
                                                          
79
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To overcome this requirement, courts have taken a contextual approach.  This approach takes account of 
the social dynamics between brands and their relevant public, and thereby the intrinsic value the brands hold for 
their relevant public.  In the 1970s while having disputing parties operate within a common field of trade was 
increasingly rationalised as a condition in the marketplace under which the public would be more likely 
confused between the goods of these parties,
86
 the issue remained an obstacle for protection against those who 
merchandised using the claimants’ identities, fictional characters or their facsimiles.  The court’s decision made 
no reference to any evidence from the marketplace in one 1975 case;
87
 and in another, the evidence for passing 
off in the false merchandising claim which extended beyond a common field of trade appeared ‘a good long way 
off, if in fact it ever does arise’.88   In the 1976 case where images of the pop group ABBA were used for the 
defendant’s merchandising, the court found the ‘common field of activity’ merely a shorthand term to indicate a 
real possibility of confusion.  
This necessity, the need to show that reasonable people might think that the plaintiffs’ activities were 
associated with the defendants’ goods or business, at least to the extent of implying some sort of 
approval on the part of the plaintiff, is something which might … be said to cause damage to the 
plaintiffs…89  
In this case, the court found the plaintiffs had no business within the jurisdiction which would be confused with 
the defendants’.  Furthermore, although evidence in the case suggested that some members of the public might 
have thought ABBA had granted license for the use of the name, why they should do so appeared inexplicable 
to the court for want of evidence of ‘any general custom for such licenses to be granted by pop singers’.90  
Interlocutory relief was denied.  Nevertheless, the court appeared open to consider the public understanding of 
branding practices.  Also by this time, there was judicial recognition that harm to reputation rather than loss of 
sales was the main concern for claimants seeking injunctive relief under passing off because harm to their 
reputation would be unquantifiable.
91
   
By 1990, the court noted the increasing sophistication of the merchandising industry
92
 in a case where 
the defendant sought to take advantage of the plaintiffs’ popular concept of humanoid turtle cartoon characters93 
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and produced clothing with similar drawings.  The court found the relevant public would expect items bearing 
such popular characters as the plaintiffs’ to have been merchandised by the copyright owner.  Where the public 
would mistake the defendant’s goods for the plaintiffs’ or as having been licensed by the plaintiffs, passing off 
was established.
94
  Here, both parties were in the business of licensing the right to use cartoon characters.  The 
law was not limited to those who marketed or sold the goods themselves.
95
  A few years later, there was judicial 
recognition that the crux of the law of passing off lied with ‘the relevant connection … by which the plaintiff 
would be taken by the public to have made themselves responsible for the quality of the defendant’s goods or 
services.’96  This relevant connection may suggest both instrumental and intrinsic value where the plaintiff is 
known for having expertise in the quality of such goods.  The force of the intrinsic value alone is more apparent 
where it can leverage the goodwill to influence purchase decisions in a different trade sector.  Third parties, such 
as the defendant in ABBA, might capitalise on this intrinsic value for merchandising, and cause the public to 
attribute the quality of the defendant’s goods as the plaintiff’s.      
Notwithstanding decisions such as McCulloch and ABBA, the law has long protected certain non-trade 
claimants by overcoming any requirement of a common field of trade between disputing parties.  In doing so, it 
arguably protects the intrinsic value for these particular claimants.  These claimants tend to be professional and 
trade governing and promoting bodies, charities and like non-profit organisations.  In many cases these bodies 
also provide public quality assurance by certifying a standard of knowledge among their members.  Such 
membership confers an additional status for the profession.
97
  In other cases as in some charities, membership is 
loosely organised.
98
  Where the benefactors of these organisations’ work are also the beneficiaries of their work, 
passing off may be more readily established in instrumental terms.
99
  Even where the goodwill engendered by 
these organisations is not aimed at generating revenue, courts have rationalised harm to trade goodwill in terms 
of a potential loss of membership and the associated fees in some cases,
100
 and loss of donation or sponsorship 
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in charity cases.
101
  While such loss from passing off may be tangible in some cases, it was acknowledged in 
obiter to be artificially construed to fit within the requirements of the law of passing off.
102
  Courts have also 
recognised the potential harm in the loss of confidence in the profession or trade as a result of passing off.
103
  
The governing bodies carry an authoritative force as well as, particularly for charities, a moral force for their 
social causes.  Such intrinsic value renders them attractive to third party exploitation.  Injurious association by 
appearances of false endorsement
104
 or affiliation
105
 would be detrimental to them.  While economic harm is 
quantifiable, the loss of public confidence is not.
106
  Courts have granted injunctive relief on these occasions.
107
   
In the 2002 case of Irvine, Laddie J at the High Court drew on British Medical Association v. Marsh 
which upheld a passing off claim where the claimant’s well-known initials ‘B.M.A.’, for the non-trade medical 
professional body, were used by the defendant for the sale of medicine.  Laddie J observed in Irvine:  ‘Thus it 
was damage to the reputation of the BMA which perfected the cause of action, the loss of membership was the 
consequence in money terms of that damage.’108  In Irvine, the claimant’s expertise lied in Formula One racing.  
His success enabled him to leverage his goodwill as a race car driver to diverse endorsement opportunities such 
as those with HILFIGER for clothing
109
 and GILLETTE for razors,
110
 in sectors beyond his Formula One racing 
career.
111
  Laddie J noted that the disputed advertisement did not use an unknown person’s photograph, but 
rather specifically used Irvine’s.112  It was specifically from the intrinsic value in Irvine’s brand appeal that the 
defendant sports radio station sought to profit.  While making doctrinal references to trade mark dilution 
principles,
113
 Laddie J further noted the branding practice of associating the ‘lustre of a famous personality’ with 
a trader’s goods to attract custom.  Moreover, Irvine had an existing endorsement public profile.  The 
defendant’s advertisement might mislead others to think that the defendant’s was among Irvine’s paid and 
approved endorsements.
114
  Prospective business partners might be influenced by this erroneous profile of Irvine 
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in considering their future engagement with him.  The Court of Appeal appreciated the endorsement generated 
by the intrinsic value in claimant’s brand appeal.  It substantially increased the award of damages.115   
By this time, the human rights discourse formed a backdrop of social values against which passing off 
cases were resolved.  High profile cases dealing with third party use of celebrity photographs were making their 
way through the courts.
116
  The postscript in Irvine
117
 noted that if the law of passing off had not developed 
sufficiently to cover the false endorsement claim made there, it would have been necessary to invoke the then 
new strand of law under Human Rights Act 1998, in particular in respect of the right to property
118
 and the right 
to private and family life.  Under Art. 8 of the ECHR, privacy rights encompass a ‘right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings and the right to identity and personal development;’119 they include the 
right against being cast under a false light.
120
  Cast under a false light, Irvine might suffer in his attempt to 
establish and develop relationship with others, inter alia for endorsement purposes.  Irvine used his 
endorsements to enhance his image as a racing driver to advance further endorsement opportunities.
121
  Irvine 
acknowledged that by casting the claimant in the defendant radio station’s advertisement, the defendant intended 
that Irvine’s apparent endorsement of the station would make it more attractive to potential listeners and thus 
advertisers to the radio station.
122
  However, Irvine’s own endorsement profile might be affected thereby.  The 
court also recognised that ‘the damage already done to Mr Irvine may be negligible in direct money terms, but 
the potential long-term damage is considerable.’123   
Similarly for the freedom of expression afforded under Art. 10 of the ECHR, scholars have argued 
within a passing off context that a basic requirement for the realisation of one’s autonomy lies in a right not to 
be displaced with another’s expression as one’s own.124  Furthermore scholars have argued that ‘freedom of 
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expression includes the right not to be held out as holding views that one finds objectionable.’125  It includes 
commercial speech which, though important to inform consumers in a market economy,
126
 is trumped by 
political speech which directly impacts on the operation of a democratic system which controls the economy.  
The freedom here includes that for non-speech activities which subtly impart and validate elements of personal 
identities, social belongings and values.
127
  Passing off also protects claimants from the damaging impact of 
being falsely perceived as associated with the defendant.
128
  Passing off has been found for the chief executives 
of an association where a politician falsely claimed membership to the association on his election papers.
129
  
Passing off has also been found where a politician’s message may be misattributed to a commercial enterprise 
by using an image of the latter’s MARMITE jar in a party political broadcast.130  In these contexts, the law 
appears to be giving increased recognition to the intrinsic values in brands that reach beyond the branded 
goods.
131
  Similarly, Irvine addressed a false endorsement claim.       
2.4 Goodwill in merchandising   
A year prior to Irvine, Laddie J delivered a controversial decision on a false merchandising claim in 
passing off in Arsenal Football Club v. Reed.
132
  His approach here, as in Irvine, was fact-focussed.  The 
defendant had been selling football souvenirs and memorabilia bearing the logo of the claimant’s football team 
for 31 years and had done so on the claimant’s grounds for some 15 years.  Arsenal took little interest in similar 
sales for itself until the 1990s when it also registered its logos as trade marks.  The defendant claimed that 
purchasers did not use these logos to determine the provenance of the merchandise, but rather bought the logo-
bearing merchandise to show support for their football team.  Laddie J declared:  ‘Passing off is concerned with 
what is happening and what is likely to happen in the marketplace’,133 or ‘the real world of the marketplace’.134  
He found no actual consumer confusion attributable to the defendant especially in view of the defendant’s 
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longstanding business and the proximity to the claimant’s competing business.135  Through the efforts of both 
parties, purchasers were able to distinguish the ‘official’ merchandise from the other merchandise sold by the 
defendant at the point of purchase.
136
  Post-purchase confusion among Arsenal fans bearing official as opposed 
to unofficial merchandise was not considered.  The Court of Appeal was critical of Laddie’s decision for relying 
on outdated principles of passing off
137
 even though passing off was not at issue on appeal; the interpretation of 
the criticism remains under discussion.
138
  One line of discussion suggests that post-purchase confusion might 
be considered in future passing off cases.
139
 
A decade later in Fenty, the courts found ‘no difference in the law between an endorsement case and a 
merchandising case’.140  Fenty had goodwill in both the music and fashion industries, as well as involvement in 
merchandising and endorsement operations.
141
  Two facts appeared to be salient to the courts here:
142
  First, the 
defendant Topshop had previously featured celebrity endorsements
143
 and promoted Fenty as a fashion icon.
144
  
Second, the disputed image was taken when Fenty was on a video shoot for her music album cover.
145
  It would 
likely mislead some fans familiar with her striking and well-known music album cover to think that the T-shirt 
bearing the disputed image was a part of her music album project.
146
  While Fenty had her own branded fashion 
and had endorsed third-party fashion, she had also licensed promotional merchandise including clothing for her 
concert tours.  Such merchandised clothing would typically be of a lower quality and bear the image of the star 
on the front.  In this case, without the goodwill from her music career, the disputed image on the T-shirt alone 
would not have constituted passing off.   
To someone who knew Rihanna [ie Fenty] but did not know her current work, the image is simply one 
of the person concerned.  However to her fans who knew her work, I think this particular image might 
well be thought to be part of the marketing campaign for that [music video] project.
147
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The Appeal Court cautioned that with awareness of merchandising practices, the public might not necessarily be 
misled to think the products bearing the image of a famous personality came from the personality.  Indeed, 
different brands relate differently to their consumers, and vice versa.  An evidence-based approach in Fenty 
showed the defendant’s activities amounted to a misrepresentation that the claimant had endorsed the goods.148  
Consistent with recent case law for passing off,
149
 the Appeal Court in Fenty considered two critical hurdles to 
overcome in a merchandising claim:  First, that the use of the name or image had the effect of telling a lie.  The 
use must denote something about the claimant’s responsibility over the quality of the defendant’s disputed 
goods.  Second, the lie must be sufficiently material, resulting in a purchase decision.
150
  The case considered 
the potential of both the harm to instrumental value in lost sales to the claimant’s merchandising business, and in 
the harm to intrinsic value through a loss of control over her reputation.
151
   
For one thing it amounts to sales lost to her merchandising business.  It also represents a loss of control 
over her reputation in the fashion sphere …  It is a matter for the claimants and not Topshop to choose 
what garments the public think are endorsed by her.
152
 
Thus, by taking a contextual approach, courts are appreciating that the claimant’s goodwill in the 
marketplace not only distinguishes the claimant’s goods from those of others.  More fundamentally given that 
the law of passing off requires that the market is already familiar with the claimant’s branded goods, the brand 
may have an intrinsic value in the market place.  Its clientele and potential clientele may identify with the brand; 
its intrinsic value may influence purchase decisions, albeit in diverse trade sectors.  Fan interest in ABBA, 
Arsenal, and Fenty merchandising demonstrates that such brand appeal may extend beyond the claimants’ own 
goods (in music in relation to Fenty).  Shortly before delivering his decision in Irvine, Laddie J stated in another 
passing off decision:  
Goodwill is of value, not only in respect of current business, but also because of future business 
opportunities it will nurture.  It is its power to support and improve future business which gives it its 
value and makes it saleable.  It is acquired by trading and advertising in the past but its value is in the 
way it promotes future business.
153
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The instrumental value in a brand facilitates current business and repeat and recommended purchases by 
enabling purchase decisions to be made based on functional needs.  The intrinsic value in a brand can promote, 
improve, and indeed develop future business by engaging the purchasers’ and prospective purchasers’ sense of 
identity and social belonging or aspiration.      
Arguably claimants in Clark, McCulloch, ABBA, Irvine, and Fenty desired not only monetary relief, but 
where applicable, injunctive relief to protect their current income stream and, moreover, to regain control over 
the intrinsic value in their brands to garner future business.  These claimants were cast in the false light of their 
defendants’ advertisements or merchandising; the public might erroneously attribute this casting to the 
claimants.  Being cast in a false light deprives the claimants control over the intrinsic value in their brands, their 
brands as being ‘partly constitutive of a community which is normally a focus of identification.’  The recent 
decisions in Irvine and Fenty recognise that passing off affects not only the instrumental value leading to 
fungible loss, but also the intrinsic value leading to less quantifiable but potentially longer-term loss.  
3. Goodwill beyond goods:  
This bifurcated approach to goodwill, using Raz’s terminology of instrumental and intrinsic value, sees 
brands not only as sources of consumer information, but also as cultural artefacts with which consumers may 
identify.  Brands inform consumers of the utility of their underlying goods.  Thereby they promote their goods 
to customers.  This instrumental value in brands remains with their goods.  By becoming a point of identity for 
consumers and providing a sense of social belonging or aspiration (for example, by McDonald’s restaurants 
offering cobranded games for children and supporting children welfare charities,
154
 or in its ‘Forever Young’ 
campaign, by its mascot appearing with sports stars
155
), brands may also acquire an intrinsic value.  They can 
mobilise a collective (respectively, the traditional toddlers-and-parents market and the new health conscious 
young adult market).  The identity of that collective further informs the brand’s identity.   
In this way, similar social dynamics as those analysed here vis-à-vis claimants whose personal 
identities are at stake may apply to corporate (as opposed to personal) brands.  Corporate brands do not suffer 
human indignities; they are also alienable.  Nevertheless, they too need to be protected from being cast under a 
false light because their intrinsic value depends on their ability to appeal to and be ‘partly constitutive of a 
community [of individuals] which is normally a focus of identification’.156  When cast under a false light, brands 
lose control over their attraction for spokespersons and role models, and reference and peer consumers who 
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would appeal to their target markets or be a part of those markets.  In addition to protecting the goodwill of the 
professional and trade governing and promoting bodies as discussed earlier, within commercial contexts, courts 
have granted relief to protect not only the immediate purchasers, but also the final consumers, the suppliers, and 
the sponsoring advertisers who may be confused under passing off.
157
  By assessing passing off in the broader 
context of what Laddie J termed the ‘real world of the marketplace’, courts are coming to terms with the 
protection in not only of the instrumental value in brands, but also their intrinsic value.  It is arguably this 
intrinsic value which defendants such as those in Clark, McCulloch, ABBA, Irvine, and Fenty have sought to 
exploit, and the claimants have sought to protect.  While these claimants’ personal identities were at stake in 
these cases, as the law of passing off protects only pre-existing goodwill, such goodwill in corporate brands are 
often associated with or negotiated through individuals – as designated or volunteer spokespersons, role models, 
reference and peer consumers.  It is these individuals who would inhabit or represent a corporate brand, and 
showcase a narrative for it.  It is these individuals with whom prospective consumers would identify and join as 
constituents of a brand, or with whom prospective business partners would associate.  It is these individuals who 
help influence or even drive purchase or business decisions.  These individuals may shun a brand that has been 
cast under a false light, as shown in the cases that protect the goodwill of the professional and trade governing 
and promoting bodies. 
Goodwill was initially cast as property by early claimants who desired injunctive over monetary relief; 
the Courts of Chancery alone could grant injunctive relief and they also had clear jurisdiction to uphold 
proprietary interests.  What passing off claimants then and now seek to protect however is not only the static 
instrumental value in their brands to distinguish their goods from others’.  Goods are fungible; lost sales are 
quantifiable and may be remedied monetarily.  The passing off claimants seek injunctive relief to protect the 
intrinsic value in their brands.  This concern is forward looking.  This wider brand appeal imbued with social 
values and meanings as a point of identity for target markets allows claimants to mobilise and marshal their 
clientele and develop new clientele.  Once the brand is launched, the social values and meanings represented in 
its promotional efforts, by its spokespersons, as well as its consumers and commentators continue to inform the 
brand.  Claimants are eager to ensure that those whose purchase or business decisions their brands may 
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influence are engaging with their brand identities, not identities that are manipulated by third parties and that are 
falsely attributed to the claimants, or identities that cast the claimants in a false light.  Claimants desire to 
control their goodwill so that they may retain the integrity of their going-concerns to plan for the future.  The 
instrumental value in brands to distinguish their goods from others’ serves to retain this control as status quo; 
the intrinsic value in brands helps brands to marshal their clientele and to develop future clienteles. 
4. Conclusion: 
The law of passing off too may be viewed in this bifurcated way.  The instrumental value in the law lies 
in its role in ensuring that a trader does not pass off his or her goods as those of another.  To remain relevant in 
the minds of its constituents and to remain intrinsically valuable, it is ‘closely connected to and dependent upon 
what is happening in the market place.’158  As a part of unfair competition law or economic tort,159 the law has 
as an ‘underlying principle … the maintenance of what is currently regarded as fair trading.  [It] responds to 
changes in the nature of trade.’160  The law has evolved to increasingly take into account the intrinsic value in 
brands as points of identity.  For example, the intrinsic value carried arguably in reference to Clark, presumably 
for his status as Physician in Ordinary to the Queen and a specialist in consumption, was dismissed in Clark.
161
  
That carried arguably in reference to ‘Uncle Mac’, presumably for the claimant’s radio appeal to children, was 
dismissed in McCulloch.
162
  The instrumental value of the claimants’ brands was not at issue in these cases.  The 
disputing parties did not operate within a common field, and so there was no passing off by way of a goods-for-
goods substitution.  Developments in the law of passing off as well as those toward and in trade mark licensing 
allowed traders to take advantage of the intrinsic value in their brands to serve not only a product segment, but a 
market segment which embraces the lifestyle narrative and broader social values of their consumers.         
The intrinsic value in brands is however difficult to conceptualise in legal terms.  Recent courts account 
for it and overcome the idea of requiring a common field between the disputing parties by taking a contextual 
approach to consider the social dynamics between consumers and the claimants’ brands in the creation of 
goodwill in the market place.  Under Raz’s conception, the law would be all the more compelling if its 
constituents would identify with it and where it is consonant with the broader political and social reality.  The 
recent developments in the law of passing off, especially as they pertain to personal identities in Irvine and 
Fenty, coincided and appear consonant with the broader developments in human rights law in the UK.  These 
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developments in human rights law help affirm those in the law of passing off as an integral part of the broader 
political and social reality and the social values that lie therein.  These developments in human rights law also 
help explain how the intrinsic value of brands may be affected in passing off.  While the human right to property 
in goodwill as interpreted under Art. 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR limits the claim and takes a mere snapshot of 
the accrued income or that within a ‘legitimate expectation’ at a relevant date, it may serve as a backstop to 
enable the fulfilment of other human rights
163
 such as the rights to privacy and to free speech
164
 recognised 
respectively under Arts. 8 and 10 of the ECHR.  The former protects the right to establish and develop 
relationships with others and the right to identity and personal development.
165
  It includes the right against 
being cast under a false light.  The latter also protects the right not to be displaced with another’s expression as 
one’s own.166  Passing off protects claimants from being cast under a false light or being falsely perceived as 
professionally associated with the defendant.  It protects the claimants’ goodwill and with it, the claimant’s 
professional relationships.  Recent case law maintains that to constitute passing off, the use of the claimant’s 
name or image must have the effect of telling a lie to denote the claimant’s endorsement of the defendant’s 
advertisement or goods, and that lie must be sufficient to result in a change in purchase decisions or other 
professional dealings with the claimant.
167
   By taking a contextual approach in Irvine and Fenty, the courts 
considered the social dynamics between brands and their relevant public, and how these dynamics may be 
altered as a result of the misrepresentation.   
The English law of passing off is not protean.  Rather, the claimants’ concerns have been consistent 
throughout in Clark, McCulloch, ABBA, Irvine, and Fenty.  They wish to regain control over not only the 
instrumental value but also the intrinsic value in their brands.  Even though this intrinsic value may be difficult 
to conceptualise in law, by taking a contextual approach, the courts are applying doctrines from the law of 
passing off with a fuller appreciation of the claimants’ concerns.  Informed by this fuller understanding of the 
market place and consonant with the broader social values from the human rights discourse in the backdrop, the 
law of passing off maintains its relevance and its intrinsic value among its constituents.  As it enforces a 
standard of fair trading, it also embodies a standard that is accepted by its constituents and affirms their social 
values.  The law of passing off too has both instrumental and intrinsic value.  It manifests and enforces a social 
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norm.  As it is applied in view of contemporary branding practices and social dynamics in a way that is 
consonant with the broader social values, it is also forward looking.              
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